
Learning to Forget
by David Fitzgerald
"US Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Practice from Vietnam to Iraq"
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Learning to Forget by David Fitzgerald
Details
War:
Vietnam War
Military Unit:
US Army
True Story:
Yes
Biography:
No
Region:
Asia
Page Count:
298
Published Date:
2013
ISBN13:
9780804786423
Description
Main Themes and Topics
Learning to Forget by David Fitzgerald delves into the intricacies of US counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine over a span of fifty years. A prominent theme is the interplay between history and military strategy, emphasizing how historical events, such as the Vietnam War, have perpetually shaped and reshaped military doctrines. The book highlights the cyclical nature of COIN strategy—its decline post-Vietnam, resurgence during the Reagan era, and its eventual application in conflicts like Bosnia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Fitzgerald also explores the concept of constructing historical memory, illustrating how military leaders learn, or sometimes fail to learn, from past experiences to meet contemporary challenges.
Writing Style and Tone
David Fitzgerald employs a scholarly tone, suitable for a work rooted in military history and theory. The writing is analytical and detailed, underpinned by rigorous research that offers a comprehensive examination of COIN doctrine. While the style is rich in historical detail, it remains accessible to readers with a keen interest in military tactics and historical analysis. The narrative is structured to methodically outline the evolution of military thought, ensuring that even complex theoretical developments are clearly communicated.
Brief Summary
Learning to Forget provides a thorough exploration of US counterinsurgency efforts over the past fifty years. Beginning with an examination of the Vietnam War, Fitzgerald traces the decline in COIN interest during the 1970s, followed by its resurgence in subsequent decades. The book culminates in a reflection on how the US Army has grappled with past lessons in recent conflicts. It provides a critical perspective on how historical memories are constructed and utilized to inform present-day military strategies, ultimately presenting a new theory of doctrinal development.