The CIA War in Kurdistan

Charles S. Faddis provides a compelling firsthand account of a largely overlooked chapter of the Iraq War in this detailed narrative of CIA operations in Kurdistan during 2003. As a career CIA officer who led the agency's team in northern Iraq before and during the invasion, Faddis offers readers an insider's perspective on the covert campaign that opened a crucial second front against Saddam Hussein's regime.

The book centers on the deployment of a small CIA paramilitary team into Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq in the months leading up to the March 2003 invasion. Faddis and his colleagues worked alongside Kurdish peshmerga forces to prepare for military operations against Iraqi government troops positioned along the Green Line, the boundary separating Kurdish autonomous territory from areas under Baghdad's control. This northern effort, though less publicized than the main invasion from Kuwait, played a significant role in stretching Iraqi forces and preventing them from consolidating their defense in the south.

One of the book's strengths lies in its detailed description of the operational challenges faced by CIA officers working in austere conditions with limited resources. Faddis describes the difficulties of coordinating with multiple Kurdish factions, managing complex political relationships, and operating in mountainous terrain while maintaining communication with headquarters thousands of miles away. The narrative illustrates how a relatively small team of American operatives, working with Kurdish allies, managed to tie down numerous Iraqi divisions that might otherwise have reinforced defenses elsewhere.

The author provides significant insight into the relationship between CIA personnel and the Kurdish peshmerga fighters who served as their primary partners. The Kurds, who had suffered greatly under Saddam Hussein's regime, including chemical weapons attacks in the 1980s, were eager allies but brought their own political agendas and inter-factional rivalries. Faddis navigates these sensitivities while highlighting the effectiveness of the Kurdish forces and the crucial role they played in the northern campaign.

A recurring theme throughout the book concerns the friction between CIA operations and conventional military planning. Faddis describes tensions that arose when the expected deployment of the 4th Infantry Division through Turkey failed to materialize due to the Turkish parliament's refusal to grant permission. This left CIA teams and their Kurdish allies more exposed than anticipated and forced significant adjustments to operational plans. The book documents how these small teams adapted to changing circumstances and maintained pressure on Iraqi forces despite being vastly outnumbered.

The narrative includes detailed accounts of combat operations, including the seizure of key terrain and urban areas in northern Iraq. Faddis describes engagements with Iraqi military units, the challenges of calling in airstrikes, and the chaos of coordinating fast-moving operations with limited personnel. These passages offer valuable perspective on the realities of unconventional warfare and the complexities of working by, with, and through indigenous forces.

Another important aspect of the book addresses the immediate post-invasion period and the challenges that emerged as the focus shifted from combat operations to stabilization. Faddis discusses the difficulties of managing expectations among Kurdish allies, preventing score-settling against Arab populations, and dealing with the early signs of insurgent activity. His observations about the transition from invasion to occupation provide context for understanding subsequent difficulties that emerged during the broader Iraq War.

The writing style is straightforward and accessible, avoiding excessive technical jargon while providing enough operational detail to satisfy readers interested in the mechanics of covert operations. Faddis writes from direct experience, lending authenticity to his descriptions of events and decision-making processes. The book moves at a steady pace, balancing action sequences with explanatory passages about the broader strategic context.

While the narrative naturally reflects the author's own perspective and experiences, it offers valuable documentation of an under-reported aspect of the Iraq War. The northern front, though smaller in scale than the main invasion route, demonstrated the potential effectiveness of unconventional warfare approaches combining special operations forces, indigenous partners, and precision airpower. The lessons and observations contained in this account remain relevant for understanding both the Iraq War specifically and irregular warfare more broadly.

This book serves as an important primary source for historians and military professionals seeking to understand the full scope of operations during the 2003 Iraq invasion. It fills a gap in the public record by documenting CIA activities that, due to their classified nature, often remain obscured. For readers interested in intelligence operations, unconventional warfare, Kurdish history, or the Iraq War, this account provides substantial value through its detailed, ground-level perspective on a significant but often forgotten campaign.