The Crossing of the Suez

"The Crossing of the Suez" is a first-hand military account written by Saad El Shazly, the Egyptian general who served as Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Armed Forces during the October 1973 War, also known as the Yom Kippur War or the Ramadan War. The book presents Shazly's perspective on the planning, execution, and aftermath of the Egyptian military operation to cross the Suez Canal and challenge Israeli forces stationed along the Bar Lev Line. As one of the principal architects of the operation, Shazly offers readers a rare inside view of high-level military decision-making during one of the most consequential conflicts in modern Middle Eastern history.

The narrative begins with an examination of the strategic and political context leading up to the war, including the lingering effects of Egypt's defeat in the 1967 Six-Day War and the subsequent efforts to rebuild and modernize the Egyptian military. Shazly details the extensive planning process that went into Operation Badr, the codename for the canal crossing operation, describing the logistical challenges of moving troops and equipment across a heavily fortified waterway under the watch of Israeli defenses. His descriptions of the engineering solutions developed to breach the sand ramparts along the canal, as well as the deception measures used to achieve surprise, provide insight into the technical and tactical dimensions of the campaign.

What distinguishes this book from many other war memoirs is its willingness to address controversy directly. Shazly does not shy away from criticizing decisions made after the initial successful crossing, particularly regarding the subsequent Egyptian advance beyond the range of surface-to-air missile protection. He argues that this decision, made under political pressure and against his own recommendations, exposed Egyptian forces to Israeli air power and contributed to reversals later in the conflict, including the Israeli counteroffensive that resulted in the crossing of the canal at Deversoir. These sections of the book are notably candid, reflecting Shazly's strained relationship with President Anwar Sadat and War Minister Ahmed Ismail Ali in the aftermath of the war.

The author's tone throughout is measured and analytical, befitting his background as a career military officer. He writes with the precision one would expect from a general accustomed to briefing subordinates and superiors alike, favoring clear explanations of troop movements, command structures, and strategic rationale over dramatic flourishes. This approach makes the book valuable as a primary source for those interested in the operational history of the war, though readers seeking a more emotionally engaging narrative may find certain sections dense with military terminology and organizational detail.

The book also carries significant historical weight due to the circumstances of its publication. Shazly was removed from his position shortly after the war and later served as Egypt's ambassador to Portugal before falling out of favor with the Sadat government entirely. His subsequent exile and the controversy surrounding the book's release in Egypt, where it faced censorship for years, add an additional layer of context for readers. The very existence of this memoir represents an act of historical reckoning by a man who felt his role in a pivotal moment had been misrepresented by official narratives.

For readers interested in military history, particularly the history of Arab-Israeli conflicts, this book offers an essential counterpoint to Israeli-centric accounts of the 1973 war that have historically dominated Western literature on the subject. It complements works by other military historians and participants, providing a fuller picture of how both sides approached the conflict's key turning points. Those without a background in military strategy might find some passages challenging, as the book assumes a degree of familiarity with basic tactical concepts and Cold War-era Middle Eastern politics.

Overall, "The Crossing of the Suez" stands as an important primary document for understanding the 1973 war from an Egyptian command perspective. Its value lies not in literary polish but in the authenticity and specificity of its author's testimony. Anyone seeking to understand the complexities of the October War, including its initial successes and eventual complications, will find this book a substantive and thought-provoking resource.