The March of Folly

Barbara W. Tuchman's "The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam" stands as a provocative examination of governmental incompetence throughout history. Published in 1984, this work by the two-time Pulitzer Prize-winning historian investigates a specific type of political failure: decisions made by governments that directly contradicted their own interests, pursued despite the availability of viable alternatives and clear warnings from contemporaries.

Tuchman establishes strict criteria for what constitutes "folly" in her historical analysis. The policy must have been perceived as counter-productive in its own time, not merely in hindsight. Feasible alternative courses of action must have been available. The policy must have been pursued by more than one individual or administration, demonstrating persistence beyond personal quirks. Finally, the policy must have been that of a group, not just an individual ruler. These parameters provide structure to her investigation and distinguish folly from simple miscalculation or the limitations of historical knowledge.

The book examines four major historical episodes. The work opens with the Trojans' decision to bring the Greek wooden horse into their city despite numerous warnings, drawing from classical sources to illustrate ancient governmental blindness. Tuchman then analyzes the Renaissance papacy's behavior during the Protestant Reformation, arguing that the corruption and intransigence of six popes between 1470 and 1530 directly provoked and accelerated the Protestant break from Rome. The third case study explores British policy toward the American colonies, demonstrating how successive British governments pursued measures that pushed the colonies toward independence despite warnings from informed observers and the clear economic and strategic value of maintaining colonial loyalty.

The final and most extensive section addresses American involvement in Vietnam from the 1940s through the 1970s. Tuchman traces how five successive American administrations escalated commitment to Vietnam despite consistent evidence that the policy was failing and despite the absence of vital American interests in the region. This section benefits from Tuchman's access to recently declassified documents and her interviews with key participants, though she maintains her characteristic analytical distance.

Tuchman's prose remains accessible throughout, avoiding the dense academic style that often characterizes historical scholarship. Her narrative moves efficiently between broad analysis and vivid historical detail, making complex political situations comprehensible without oversimplification. The author demonstrates her extensive research through careful documentation while keeping the focus on the human dimensions of political decision-making.

The book's central thesis challenges comfortable assumptions about progress and rationality in government. Tuchman argues that wooden-headedness—the refusal to benefit from experience or adjust policies in light of evidence—represents a persistent feature of governance across centuries and cultures. This pattern emerges regardless of the specific governmental system, historical period, or cultural context, suggesting something fundamental about institutional behavior and human nature in positions of power.

Critics have noted certain limitations in Tuchman's approach. Her definition of folly excludes many disastrous policies that might seem to qualify, while her insistence on contemporaneous criticism as a criterion raises questions about whose contemporary voices count as valid warnings. The case studies vary considerably in the depth of available evidence, with the Trojan War episode relying heavily on literary sources of questionable historical reliability. Some historians have also questioned whether the selected episodes truly represent the same phenomenon or whether Tuchman's framework imposes artificial unity on disparate historical situations.

The Vietnam section, while the most detailed, dates the book in certain respects. Written in the early 1980s, before the full opening of archives and the passage of more time, this analysis necessarily lacks the perspective that subsequent decades have provided. Nevertheless, Tuchman's core observations about bureaucratic momentum, the difficulty of reversing failed policies, and the tendency of governments to prioritize credibility over effectiveness remain relevant to contemporary policy discussions.

The book's enduring value lies less in its specific historical claims than in the questions it raises about governmental decision-making. Tuchman compels readers to consider why institutions repeatedly pursue self-defeating courses, why warning signs go unheeded, and why alternatives remain unexplored. These questions transcend the particular cases she examines and speak to ongoing concerns about political judgment and institutional learning.

"The March of Folly" represents Tuchman's characteristic approach to history: narrative-driven, thematically organized, and focused on the human elements of historical change. The book serves both as an engaging work of historical synthesis and as a meditation on the persistent challenges of governance, making it valuable for readers interested in history, politics, and the recurring patterns of human institutional behavior.