Who Can Hold the Sea

James D. Hornfischer's final work, "Who Can Hold the Sea: The U.S. Navy in the Cold War, 1945-1960," represents a masterful examination of a pivotal yet often overlooked period in American naval history. Published posthumously in 2024, this comprehensive narrative captures the Navy's transformation from a World War II fighting force into the technological and strategic backbone of Cold War deterrence. Hornfischer, acclaimed for his previous naval histories including "The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors" and "Neptune's Inferno," brings his characteristic storytelling prowess to bear on this complex era of maritime strategy and geopolitical tension.

The book opens in the immediate aftermath of World War II, when the United States Navy stood as the most powerful naval force ever assembled. Yet this position of dominance quickly became precarious as demobilization pressures mounted, budgets shrank, and a fundamental question emerged: what role would sea power play in an age dominated by atomic weapons and ideological confrontation? Hornfischer skillfully navigates these uncertain waters, demonstrating how Navy leaders fought not only external threats but also internal battles within the American defense establishment for relevance and resources.

Central to the narrative is the intense interservice rivalry that characterized the early Cold War years. The newly independent Air Force, armed with strategic bombers and nuclear weapons, claimed primacy in American defense planning. This challenge forced naval strategists to reimagine their service's mission and capabilities. Hornfischer chronicles the infamous "Revolt of the Admirals" in 1949, when senior naval officers publicly challenged Air Force doctrine and the cancellation of the supercarrier USS United States. This controversy exposed deep fissures in American strategic thinking and raised fundamental questions about the future of naval aviation and carrier warfare.

The Korean War emerges as a crucial turning point in Hornfischer's analysis. The conflict demonstrated conclusively that limited wars in distant theaters still required naval power projection, amphibious capability, and carrier-based air support. The Inchon landing, naval gunfire support operations, and the sustained carrier strikes against North Korean targets vindicated the Navy's arguments about versatility and forward presence. Hornfischer presents these operations not merely as tactical successes but as strategic vindication of the naval service in the nuclear age.

Technological innovation forms another major thread throughout the work. The transition from conventional to nuclear propulsion revolutionized submarine warfare and carrier operations. Admiral Hyman Rickover's relentless drive to develop nuclear power plants for naval vessels receives detailed attention, including the political maneuvering and technical challenges involved. The USS Nautilus, the world's first nuclear-powered submarine, represented more than an engineering achievement; it fundamentally altered strategic calculations about sea control and undersea warfare. Similarly, the development of guided missiles, improved radar systems, and nuclear-capable aircraft transformed the carrier from a platform for traditional naval aviation into a mobile base for strategic strike operations.

Hornfischer excels at weaving together multiple narrative strands: strategic debates in Washington, technological developments in shipyards and laboratories, and operational challenges faced by sailors at sea. His attention to individual stories humanizes what could otherwise become an abstract discussion of policy and technology. Admirals, engineers, aviators, and submariners emerge as distinct personalities navigating unprecedented challenges. The author's extensive research is evident throughout, drawing on official records, personal papers, and previously published accounts to construct a richly detailed portrait of the era.

The book also addresses the Navy's role in developing and deploying nuclear weapons at sea. The creation of submarine-launched ballistic missiles and the evolution of nuclear strategy receive thorough examination. Hornfischer explains how the Polaris missile program ultimately provided the Navy with an unassailable mission in the nuclear triad, ensuring institutional survival and strategic relevance. These underwater deterrent forces became essential components of American national security architecture.

One of the work's notable strengths lies in its treatment of the broader geopolitical context. Soviet naval expansion, Communist threats in Asia, and the extension of American commitments across the globe all shaped naval planning and operations. The Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and the Seventh Fleet in the Western Pacific became permanent fixtures of American power projection, embodying the Navy's role in containing Communist expansion and reassuring allies.

"Who Can Hold the Sea" stands as a fitting capstone to Hornfischer's distinguished career as a naval historian. The book combines rigorous research with accessible prose, making complex strategic and technological subjects comprehensible without oversimplification. For readers interested in Cold War history, naval affairs, or the evolution of American military power, this work provides an authoritative and engaging account of how the U.S. Navy navigated the turbulent passage from World War II victory to Cold War vigilance.