Triumph Regained

Main Themes and Topics

Triumph Regained: The Vietnam War, 1965-1968 by Mark Moyar explores the contentious and multifaceted period of the Vietnam War between 1965 and 1968. As a sequel to Moyar's earlier work, Triumph Forsaken, this book continues an alternative narrative of the war, one that challenges the prevailing historical judgments of the conflict. Moyar delves into newly available sources, especially from the North Vietnamese perspective, to provide a fresh analysis of America's military efforts and strategic decisions.

One of the central themes of the book is the notion that the Vietnam War was a strategic necessity for the United States. Moyar argues that, contrary to the widespread belief that the U.S. involvement was a doomed effort, there were viable paths to success that were missed. Particularly, the narrative asserts that U.S. military operations had the potential to achieve a more favorable outcome, had President Lyndon Johnson's administration adopted different strategies advised by military leaders.

Additionally, Moyar discusses the impact of American military operations on the North Vietnamese supply system, emphasizing how close the U.S. came to forcing North Vietnam into submission through bombings like Operation Rolling Thunder. The book also tackles the idea that America's defense of South Vietnam was crucial in preventing the spread of communism in Asia and discusses its implications on the global balance of power, especially concerning China and the Soviet Union.

Writing Style and Tone

Moyar's writing in Triumph Regained is analytical and in-depth, with a strong emphasis on revisiting primary sources and historical evidence. The tone is assertive, reflecting Moyar's commitment to challenging existing interpretations of the Vietnam War. His detailed accounts and the use of new evidence showcase a scholarly approach, aimed at prompting readers and historians to reconsider the complexity of U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

Brief Summary

Triumph Regained offers a continuation of Mark Moyar's examination of the Vietnam War, focusing on the years between 1965 and 1968. The book argues against the predominant view of the era as a futile military engagement by the United States. Instead, Moyar presents a case for viewing the war as a strategically necessary endeavor, which had the potential for success under different military and political strategies. The narrative is enriched by insights from new sources, including documents from North Vietnam, and seeks to address misconceptions about America's role and objectives in the Vietnam War.