Stalin's Failed Alliance

Michael Jabara Carley's "Stalin's Failed Alliance: The Struggle for Collective Security, 1936-1939" presents a meticulously researched examination of Soviet foreign policy during the critical years leading up to World War II. The book challenges conventional narratives about the origins of the war by focusing on Soviet attempts to forge an anti-fascist alliance with Britain and France, efforts that ultimately collapsed and paved the way for the infamous Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939.

Carley, a professor of history at the Université de Montréal, draws extensively on archival materials from multiple countries to construct his argument. The book's central thesis contends that the Soviet Union actively pursued collective security arrangements with Western democracies as a means of containing Nazi Germany's expansionist ambitions. This interpretation offers a counterpoint to traditional Cold War-era scholarship that often portrayed Soviet diplomacy as inherently cynical or primarily driven by ideological considerations.

The narrative traces Soviet diplomatic initiatives across several years, detailing negotiations, proposals, and the various obstacles that prevented meaningful cooperation between Moscow and the Western powers. Carley documents how Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov championed collective security as a policy framework, proposing mutual assistance pacts and advocating for coordinated action against fascist aggression. The book examines specific crises including the Spanish Civil War, the Anschluss, and the Czechoslovak crisis, analyzing how these events tested and ultimately undermined prospects for an anti-fascist coalition.

A significant portion of the work addresses Western attitudes toward the Soviet Union during this period. Carley argues that deep-seated anti-communist sentiment among British and French political elites hampered diplomatic cooperation. The book details how ideological prejudices, coupled with wishful thinking about appeasing Hitler, led Western leaders to rebuff or delay responses to Soviet overtures. This analysis extends to examining the role of individual diplomats, politicians, and military figures whose personal views shaped their nations' policies.

The research presented demonstrates the complexity of tripartite negotiations between Britain, France, and the Soviet Union during 1939. Carley provides detailed accounts of military talks held in Moscow during the summer of that year, revealing how issues of Polish cooperation, the passage of Soviet troops through Polish territory, and questions about the seriousness of Western military commitments contributed to the negotiations' failure. The book suggests that Western negotiators lacked the authority or political will to conclude a meaningful agreement, while Soviet leaders grew increasingly skeptical of their potential partners' intentions.

Carley's interpretation necessarily engages with the controversial question of Soviet motivations and the degree to which Stalin genuinely sought an alliance with the West versus using such negotiations as leverage for an eventual accommodation with Germany. The book presents evidence suggesting that Soviet collective security efforts were serious and sustained, only abandoned after Western intransigence made alternative arrangements appear necessary for Soviet security.

The work's strength lies in its archival foundation and its attempt to present Soviet policy within the broader context of European diplomacy. By examining documents from multiple national archives, Carley constructs a multilateral perspective on the diplomatic failures of the late 1930s. This approach allows readers to understand how different national interests, domestic political constraints, and conflicting strategic assessments prevented the formation of an effective anti-Nazi coalition.

The book also addresses the broader historiographical debates about responsibility for the outbreak of World War II. By emphasizing Western failures to cooperate with the Soviet Union, Carley's work implicitly challenges interpretations that place primary blame on the Nazi-Soviet Pact for enabling Hitler's attack on Poland. Instead, the analysis suggests viewing the pact as a consequence of earlier diplomatic failures rather than their cause.

For readers interested in interwar diplomacy, the origins of World War II, or Soviet foreign policy, this book offers substantial detail and a well-documented alternative perspective. The extensive use of primary sources provides valuable insights into the calculations and miscalculations of major powers during a pivotal period. While the interpretation remains debatable and has generated scholarly discussion, the research itself represents a significant contribution to understanding the complex diplomatic landscape of the late 1930s.

"Stalin's Failed Alliance" serves as an important resource for anyone seeking to understand why collective security arrangements collapsed before World War II and how that failure shaped the catastrophic events that followed. The book demonstrates that the path to war involved multiple actors whose decisions and indecisions collectively created the conditions for conflict.